Secret
telegram
18 November 1971
From:
Amembassy Islamabad
To:
Secretary State Washington DC
Subject:
Pakistan Crisis
1.
Summary: Political officers from Embassy and constituent posts concluded at
informal Nov 12 meeting that lndian/Mukti Bahini pressures on Pak forces in
East Pak were building up to point at which GOP may be goaded into
counteractions which could precipitate Indo/Pak war. Best hope of heading off
war lies in prompt GOP moves in directions realistic political settlement in East Pakistan, but GOP actions to date
offer little promise any such moves forthcoming soon enough. End summary.
2.
Pol offs from Islamabad, Dacca, Karachi, and Lahore, and Peshawar met in Islamabad Nov 12 for informal review
current situation. Main conclusions as follows:
A. Participants saw little possibility of two wings
of Pakistan
remaining united. (Karachi expressed less dim view re
prospects for continuation united Pakistan. Dacca held
that, in eyes most East Pakistanis, de facto
separation has already taken place.)
B. Most significant current development is
increasing level military confrontation between India and Pakistan, including commitment of
Indian regular military forces in East Pakistan border fighting and
build-up in Mukti Bahini sabotage and terrorism activities during past three
weeks in interior of East Pakistan. Available information
indicates that long-rumored Mukti Bahini "offensive" in East Pakistan has probably begun and can
be expected increase in intensity.
C. Officers agreed that most likely circumstances
leading to Pakistan decision to attack India would arise when level of
fighting in east reached point where Pak military concluded that war of
attrition in east had surpassed level of tolerance. Consensus was that latter
was probably point where fighting in east begins to threaten Pak hold over urban
centers in east or to seriously impinge on Pak military resources and
capabilities in west. Paks might take such decision to launch full-scale war
when this level reached despite their awareness para-military inferior to India. Officers agreed that
probably next to impossible for outsiders to ascertain just what constitutes
Pak level of tolerance and when this point might be reached. Indian recognition
Bangladesh or Mukti Bahini seizure and
permanent occupation of significant piece of East Pak territory in name Bangladesh also seen as probable casus
belli if either occurs.
D. Officers felt GOP perception of situation in East
Pakistan was moving gradually in direction of reality but still had far to go.
While Yahya regime has conceded need for political settlement in east,
measures taken so far -- appointment civilian Governor, by-elections, amnesty
-- have been inadequate in conception and implementation. Although GOP has now
unveiled complete blueprint for ostensible return to civilian rule, program
has little chance of winning back any significant segment disaffected East Pak populace. GOP's actions
have instead tended freeze regime in untenable position and reduce its
flexibility in moving toward political settlement.
3.
Because of time limitation, comprehensive discussion of US policy interests in
evolving situation in subcontinent was not possible at
this
meeting. In general, however, officers concluded that US should
continue
search for ways to de-escalate Indo/Pak tension and to prod GOP towards
political settlement. At same time, there no room for optimism that third
country pressures in either area would be successful. Additional comments
pouched NEA/PAF.
Farland
Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur
Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 375 - 377