Telegram from the
Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/ Source: National Archives,
RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 INDIA. Secret;
Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by
Schneider on November 30. Cleared by Van Hollen, Irwin, Haig, and
Pickering in PM, and in substance by Sisco and
Colonel Gross in DOD/ISA. Approved by Secretary
Rogers. Repeated to Islamabad.
Washington, December 1, 1971, 0519Z.
216629. Subject: US Military
Sales to India.
1. As Indian forces have
become progressively involved in conflict with Pakistan on Pakistani territory we have for some time been
concerned about US military sales policy in regard to India. When East
Pakistan problem first developed
we focused on issue of military sales to Pakistan and finally dried up military sales pipeline. In view of
current Indian involvement we have come to conclusion that we must now take
action in regard to US sales to India.
2. Accordingly, decision has
been made within USG to suspend issuance of new Munitions List export licenses
and renewal of existing Munitions List licenses for military sales to India and to cancel existing licenses for approximately $2
million worth of components and machinery for manufacture of ammunition.
Remaining licenses covering items worth in neighborhood $11.5 million will
remain valid. Decision will be announced December 1 and be effective as at that
date.
3. Text of proposed
announcement by Department and supplemental background press guidance being
transmitted septel./2/
/2/ Telegram
216630 to New Delhi, December 1. (Ibid., FT 18-1 INDIA-US)
4. We recognize that this
decision will cause strong reaction in India. We have decided to take action both to make clear to GOI
seriousness with which we view present situation in which Indian and Pakistani
forces have met on Pakistan territory and to forestall domestic criticism of USG for
continued licensing of military equipment, despite India-Pak situation./3/
/3/ On December 2 Schneider
wrote to Ambassador Keating to further explain the
background to the decision. He noted that the President was exercised by what
he viewed as Prime Minister Gandhi's unresponsiveness during her recent visit
to Washington and by her failure to respond to the withdrawal proposal
put to her at the time. Schneider added that Kissinger was also discussing
suspending economic assistance to India and that Rogers was concerned. The Secretary felt that such a move could
lead to a lasting rupture in relations between the U.S. and India and he had had a long, private talk with the President on
the issue. (Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, 1971 New Delhi
Eyes Only Correspondence)
5. You should inform GOI at
appropriate level of USG decision. In addition to using text of announcement,
you may at your discretion make following points: a. In view of strong feelings
on part of USG and American people that war can provide no solution to East
Pakistan problem and in view of hostilities which have already taken place
between Indian and Pakistani forces, USG has decided to take action outlined in
public announcement (septel). b. With regard to items
in pipeline already licensed GOI will note that we are canceling licenses only
for those items related to manufacture of ammunition and small quantities
ammunition. This is being done because of direct use to which ammunition can be
put in any India-Pak conflict. c. We are not now canceling other outstanding
licenses. They will remain under review./4/ d. US will continue its effort to contribute to easing of
tensions and is taking this action as result of its view that military conflict
can only stand in way of political solution. American people will not
understand provision of new military supplies in the light of the present
military situation. e. USG continues to believe political settlement is
necessary if there is to be solution to East Pakistan
problem. We are continuing to pursue with GOP various avenues through which
negotiations toward a political settlement might be initiated. We continue to
urge India to do all possible to facilitate such negotiations. f. If
the issue of equating India and Pakistan is raised, the point should be made that this is not an
issue. We are now dealing with a situation in India in which active warfare involves Indian forces.
/4/ Ambassador Raza wrote to Sisco on December 1
to applaud what Pakistan viewed as a "friendly and timely gesture" by the
United States. He noted, however, that the decision did not affect some
of the existing licenses for military sales to India, and asked, in light of the closure of the military
pipeline to Pakistan, that those licenses be reviewed as well. (Ibid., NEA Files: Lot 73 D 69, Pakistan) Kissinger and Nixon had discussed the decision to suspend
military sales to India
on November 29 at which time Kissinger said that he and Rogers recommended that
the United
States
should "cut off everything." Nixon agreed. (Transcript of a telephone
conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box
370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) President Nixon clarified his
intention on December 2 in a handwritten note he sent to Kissinger instructing
him to "Cancel all old licenses as well as new immediately for India." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,
NSC Files, Box 341, Subject Files, President/Kissinger Memos, 1971)
6. In order minimize time
between notification of GOI and Washington announcement, Embassy should not inform GOI of US decision
prior to 9:00
p.m. Delhi time December 1. Embassy may use its discretion re how GOI
informed and content of message. We plan inform Indian Chargé here at
approximately 10
a.m. Washington time December 1./5/
/5/ Sisco
informed Chargé Rasgotra on December 1 of the
decision to suspend the licenses. Rasgotra regretted
the decision and said that the Indian Government would note the alacrity with
which the United
States
instituted a cut-off of military sales to India compared to the delays involved in the similar cut-off to Pakistan. (Telegram 216918 to New Delhi, December 1; ibid., RG 59,
Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 INDIA) Keating reported that when he informed
Foreign Secretary Kaul of the new U.S. military supply policy toward India, Kaul took the news well but
said that pressure tactics would not succeed in dissuading India from the path on which it was embarked. (Telegram 18595
from New Delhi, December 2; ibid.; Nixon
Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 571, Indo-Pak War, South
Asia, 12/1/71-12/4/71)
Rogers
Source: Document 212, volume XI, South
Asia crisis 1971, Department of State.