Secret Telegram

December 4, 1971

From: American Embassy New Delhi

To: Secretary State Washington DC

 

1. Summary: Foreign Secretary Kaul told me December 4 that Pak allegations of Indian attack in the West "absolutely fabricated and false". He gave me rundown current military situation indicating that Indian forces while going all out in East had not repeat not attacked on western frontier except in the air. He indicated GOI preferred there be no Security Council meeting. If, however, meeting did take place, he requested US support on three aspects:

 

-- That Bangla Desh representative be heard.

--That item inscribed not be old Indo-Pak but rather called

"Situation in East Bengal and its international conse­

quences".

--That any resolution that is passed deal with the situation in East Bengal and call "a spade a spade".

 

2. I was called to MEA by Foreign Secretary Kaul afternoon Decem­ber 4. It was evident from ambassadorial cars that were there that the Delhi diplomatic corps was being summoned seriatim to be given GOI position. After referring to Prime Minister's address to the na­tion (New Delhi 18716) and her speech in Parliament that morning (New Delhi 18729) Kaul handed me a situation report as of 1030 hours 4 December, which contained no new information.

 

3. Kaul said he wanted to assure me that Pakistani word about Indian initiated attacks along western frontier was "absolutely fabricated and false". He then cited three factors which supported this conten­tion:

 

--Radio Pakistan would not have needed to wait until 1830 hours 3 December to announce such allegations if they had in fact occurred earlier on, as claimed by Pak radio.

--Prime Minister and Defense Minister were both out of Delhi. Clearly if India had undertaken the attack alleged by Paki­stan.

-- Prime Minister and Defense Minister would not have been out of the city. (Prime Minister was addressing mass rally on maidan at Calcutta.)

--GOI had invited foreign correspondents that evening to go anywhere on the western front and, in fact, two press parties had departed early this morning.

 

4. Despite Pakistani attacks, Kaul said Indian army had not yet crossed the western international frontier on the ground. There had been ground contacts in the Fazilka and Poonch areas and in fact the Indian army had captured a hill position in the Kashmir Valley but, Kaul added, "in any case, that is our own territory".

 

5. The Foreign Secretary said that Pakistan had issued a proclama­tion that they were in a state of war against India at 0900 December 4. The government of India had not declared war. Furthermore, he said, the GOI had not yet recognized Bangla Desh, but would do so at the appropriate time and would keep us informed.

 

6. In analyzing the Pakistani attacks, Kaul said he considered that they had two possible motives. The first possibility was that they hoped to undertake a blitzkrieg attack on Indian air fields, and if this were the objective they were sadly disappointed. Kaul said they had shot down two Pakistani bombers, one each in Agra and Halvara. Seven sabres had been shot down in the east at the cost of one hunter aircraft. One IAF Canberra had also been damaged. He said the Paki­stani air force had gotten one spotter aircraft in Faridkot.

 

7, The Foreign Secretary said that perhaps India should thank Presi­dent Yahya for having given the ten-day warning that he gave. He cited Yahya's remark as another proof that the Pakistani attack was a premeditated one.

 

8. 1 told Kaul that I had heard from Bob Shaplen of New Yorker magazine about the circumstance under which Yahya had given his warning. Yahya had emerged from a cocktail party where he had consumed "about one and one-half quarts of alcohol" as estimated by Shaplen and was approached by Shaplen who said he wanted an in­terview. Yahya promptly agreed. Whereupon Shaplen said he would call him in the next ten days. Yahya reportedly initially said that was fine, but added that he might be at war in ten days and, therefore, he had better see him before that. Other reporters were with Shaplen who claimed this was how story gained currency. Kaul asked me to thank Shaplen on India's behalf for the warning. He said the GOI had taken the warning seriously and that was why they got off so lightly.

 

9. I asked Kaul if I was correct in believing that Indian forces would now make an all out ground and air effort in the East. Kaul replied that the forces had been instructed to take whatever steps were nec­essary to obtain a surrender of all Pakistani forces in East Bengal. He added that the Pakistanis would be well advised to surrender to the Indian army rather than to the Mukti Bahini.

 

10. Kaul said the second possible Pakistani motive had been to act in such a way as to bring the Security Council into play. He asserted that India would not be taken in with this tactic. It would insist on the right of the Bangla Desh representative to be heard. If this was not accepted they would protest and even conceivably walk out. Secondly, they would not agree to the item being raised as a "old Indo-Pak dispute". He suggested the item should be entitled "Situation in East Bengal and its international consequences".

 

11. Kaul said he realized that the Security Council was interested in securing international peace. He pointed out that India had been "shouting from the house tops for the last nine months" about the threat to peace posed by Pakistani actions in East Bengal. If even at this late stage President Yahya were to indicate a willingness to deal with the elected representatives of the people of East Bengal the situation could be retrieved. He said India had no desire to continue the conflict, but as long as the present situation continued they would have to take every necessary measure.

 

12. The Foreign Secretary said India had no designs on Pakistani ter­ritory. But, he added "this time it will not be a stalemate, even if China comes in, which we hope it won't, India would fight on to a resolute end" of this conflict.

 

13. 1 asked Kaul if they were as much opposed to a Security Council meeting as before. He confirmed this was the case, and said they didn't think a Security Council meeting would achieve anything. It was a case of Yahya trying to place the problem before the Security Council with the request that they pull his chestnuts out of the fire.

 

14. Kaul said that the Pak army had been shelling all along the west­ern frontier from Pathro in the north to Jaisalmer in the south. He said the only point where they had attempted to cross the border was near Khem Kharan where they had attacked a border security force outpost but their attack had been unsuccessful.

 

15. The Foreign Secretary said "we invite anybody to go anywhere to see for themselves" what is going on. I asked if any American cor­respondents went along either of the two press parties that were vis­iting the border areas. The Foreign Secretary replied affirmatively and said he had asked that Schanberg of the New York Times be in­cluded.

 

16. The Foreign Secretary asked what my government's attitude was towards a Security Council meeting. I told him that so far we had said we wouldn't oppose but we also wouldn't push for such a meeting. I felt it was fair to say, now that the conflict had expanded, the USG was more inclined to favor such a meeting, but I didn't think that they had any great expectations.

 

17. Kaul asked what was the US attitude toward a representative from Bangla Desh being heard. I told him I had no instructions on that point. He said that if a Security Council meeting were called he would like to make three requests to my government:

 

--That the Bangla Desh representative be heard.

--That the item to be inscribed should not be the old Indo-Pak item, but a new item.

--That any resolution that is passed deal with the Bangla Desh situation and call "a spade a spade".

 

18. I told Kaul that I assumed he meant that the Bangla Desh repre­sentatives should be heard in the Security Council as individuals but not as representatives of any established government. He agreed, but added they should be heard "as a party to the dispute". I said that I presumed that the main thing was that they should be there to tell their own story. He agreed.

 

19. Kaul then waved in front of me a piece of paper saying he had received a "loud message from Van Hollen" regarding the cessation of all military supply shipments from the US. I confirmed that we had received similar word and noted that the Foreign Minister had not used the information I had given Kaul earlier indicating that ex­isting licenses valued at approximately 11.5 million had not yet been interfered with. Kaul admitted that he had suggested to the Foreign Minister that he not refer to the 11.5 million because he anticipated it might not be long before we barred those shipments as well. I com­mented that I assumed that it was intentional on their part to down­play the amount of their US military aid.

 

20. The Foreign Secretary commented that it was our sovereign right to do as we pleased. He asked that we bear in mind, however, that India was fighting for certain values and what the US did in the cir­cumstances would have serious repercussions on Indian beliefs and attitudes not only on a government to government but also on a peo­ple to people basis. He said that they did not want "our commonly held beliefs that we share" to be forgotten.

 

21. Kaul said they were "keeping their fingers crossed" hoping it would be all over soon. On the other hand, the situation might drag on. He asserted that "we are prepared for both contingencies".

 

22. Comment: The Foreign Secretary was self-righteous and ap­peared confident almost to the point of being cocky. He clearly be­lieves in the wisdom of the actions that India has taken in the cir­cumstances.

 

Keating

 

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 412 - 416