Foreign
Relations, Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972
Released by
the Office of the Historian
TELCON
MR. KISSINGER/ SECRETARY CONNALLY
K: John, I wanted to call you because the President is going to assemble a
group of the NSC tomorrow at
C: That's
fine; or we can cancel it, Henry, if you want to. You'll be busy as hell; why
don't we just cancel it?
K: Well,
because you will be over there anyway. No, I'll have 45 minutes or so.
C: All
right or we can do it anytime. I'll be at the White House anyway so hell that
makes more sense; I'm going to be there till
so. So when I leave the President's office, I'll just come right to your
office.
K: Good,
but in case I don't -- in case something happens that does make -- cause either
of us to cancel it.
TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Connally
C: Just don't worry about it.
K: Well,
let me tell you what the issues are.
C: All
right.
K: And
where the President tends to be leaning but that's not in any way to prejudice
your judgment. The basic problem is now that the Indians have launched a
full-scale attack into
C : them I'd
like to. Go ahead.
K: (laughter)
Well, you're talking my language. The thing that concerns the President and me
is this; here we have Indian-Soviet collusion, raping a friend of ours. Secondly,
we have a situation where one of the motives that the Chinese may have had in
leaning towards us a little bit is the fear that something like this might
happen to them.
C: Yep.
K: So
that some demonstration of our willingness to stand for some principles is
important for that policy. Thirdly, if the Soviets get away with this in the
Subcontinent, we have seen the dress rehearsal for a Middle Eastern war.
C: Yep.
K: So
our -- what the President's tentative view is is to
start throttling the economic aid program to
C: We don't get a goddamn thing.
K: And
when people say that we're driving them into Soviet arms, what does that mean
operationally?
C: That's
right.
K: What
more can they do than what they are doing?
C: That's
right.
TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Connally
K: And I think we have to show that it's too risky to kick us in the
teeth.
C: You
know I'll agree with that position.
K: Well,
you've been so soft in the last few weeks --
C: (laughter)
K: --
that I've just wanted to check around.
of course
C: Well, /you know it's a very practical matter. It seems to me that
K: Yeah,
yeah.
C: By
what ever means we can divorce ourselves from them, the better off we are,
regardless of where they go.
K:
That's right. Well, then where the hell are they going go. They have their reasons
to be independent. There is as good a chance that they will try to win their
way back into our favor as there is --
C: I agree with that.
K:
Because if we -- now, no matter what we do, we can't do as much for them as the
Soviets have already done on the thing that interests them which
is to rape
C: Yep,
yep.
K: So that is the way the issue may come up, it may not come up that way
but that's at any rate where the President is leaning at this moment. And he
wanted me just to explain why we have done the things we have.
C : All right.
K: And,
of course, you will hear the rest of it there.
C: Good.
K: But let 's try to get together for lunch. I'd
like to hear what happened in
TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Connally
C: All right, fine.
K: Good,
John.
C: Thank
you, Henry.
K: Bye.
Source:
Doc 159, vol E7,