Transcript
of Telephone Conversation between President Nixon and His Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)/1/
/1/
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 397,
Telephone Conversations, Home File, Dec 1971. No classification marking. The
President was in Key Biscayne,
K: Mr.
President.
P:
Hello. It's all directly on just what we discussed.
K: And
what are they going to do?
P: Stick
with the ceasefire and withdrawal and give nothing at all on that. That he
[Rogers] says is
K:
Exactly.
P: The
/2/ See footnote 2, Document 229.
K:
Exactly.
P: And
he said that was what we would do and we would stick right with it and I said,
"Absolutely . . ." He said that was what he was going to do and I
said that's what I wanted done. So, that's that.
K:
Terrific, Mr. President.
P: Now,
I asked him what the hell we could do about the British, the French. He said
nothing. So dammit, I think-well, the British I guess
want to get along with
K: Mr.
President, if we don't [do?] act this toughly, I'm completely aboard. This is
going to be a dress rehearsal for the
P:
That's right, that's right.
K: And
I'm much more worried about the impact on the Russians.
P:
Right.
K: And
in fact we ought to consider seriously getting Vorontsov
in and telling him if the Russians continue this line, these talks on the
P: Yeah.
Well, get him in. Why don't you send a letter from me to Brezhnev?
K: All
right.
P: Why
not play it a little tougher and just say that I have very good talks-I've got
an idea, just let me look at it tomorrow-I had very good talks with Mrs. Meir when we were here and that we can make progress on
this matter at our further discussions there possibly. However, I must tell you
that in the event that this present situation goes on in
K:
Excellent, I think you should.
P: And a
letter from me to him. Let's see what happens.
K: Or at
least a message.
P: Huh?
What's that?
K: I
think that's right.
P: It
may or may not help but let's-but that will pass on. See, in other words, do it
in a way that we are passing on to him that we have made very good progress.
Now, Mr. Chairman, we would like to know what you are going to do on this, we
are keeping our side but I am very distressed after the talks I've had with Mr.
Gromyko and Dr. Kissinger has had with Mr. Dobrynin to see what are the developments here in India and
Pakistan. Now, the point is, what do we want the Russians to do though? You
know, about
K: They
could get it stopped. They could at least take a more helpful line in the UN.
P: Yeah.
Well, how about getting that message to him immediately. Now, that should not
be public, you understand. I don't want that to be out in the public.
K: Oh,
no, no. We could do that as an oral message.
P: An
oral message. But to who, that stupid Dobrynin.
K: No,
no; to Vorontsov here. Dobrynin's DCM.
P: Well,
I want it to be from me to Brezhnev.
K: You
don't want it in writing, do you?
P: It
doesn't bother me, if that will help. Whatever will help the most do.
K: Well,
let me draft something and show it to you first thing in the morning.
P: Why,
what would be the dis-well, the main thing-rather
than waiting a day, if it's going to be oral, get him in today.
K: Okay,
why don't I get Vorontsov in today.
P: Get
him in today and tell him I've just talked with you on the phone; that the
President would send this in writing but he wants this oral message to go from
him; I don't want to use the hotline; you know, give him a little of that crap
and that, Mr. Chairman, we have developed this very good relationship, I'm
delighted but I must be very frank with you. On [At] first in the Mid-East we
made very great progress and I would be interested to discuss this-Dr.
Kissinger will discuss with Dobrynin when he returns.
Then, now, on India-Pakistan we find your attitude very hard to understand and
what are you going to do? And we have got to play it with that with them on
that and the same time, Henry, on the-it will make them realize that's where
our three-day strike is also going to help.
K:
Exactly.
P: You
see, we have just got to-and Bill to my surprise, I didn't do any convincing so
apparently whatever the WSAG meetings or something, he got . . .
K: Oh,
yeah, I gave it very hard to Sisco so he got it from Sisco. . . .
P: He
was totally on board.
K: Good.
P: But
all he said was, he says I'm glad-I told him what a good job Sisco had done but that didn't seem to-he said, well, fine;
we couldn't have done it until now though because we wouldn't have had the
public opinion on our side.
K: Yeah.
P:
That's wrong, of course, we should have done it
earlier.
K:
Right, we should have done it earlier.
P: But,
nevertheless, it was well worth doing now rather than not at all.
K:
Exactly.
P: But,
Henry, don't feel that the whole thing is lost yet-
K: Oh, I
don't think it's lost if we play it hard.
P: And
incidentally, when I say play it hard, let me understand, we are not going to
roll over after they have done this horrible thing. They [We] are not going to
roll over and say, "Now,
K:
Right.
P: The
arguments from the New York Times and others will be "we will buy
ourselves a century or decades of hatred and suspicion from the Indian
people." Bullshit! What is [has] $10 billion of foreign aid bought us?
K:
Exactly.
P: But
hatred and suspicion from the Indian people.
K:
Exactly.
P: Tell
me one friend we've got in
K:
Exactly.
P: How
about putting it that way? Just as cold as that. Let's
start getting some top anti-Indian propaganda out.
K: And
that won't be unpopular in
P:
That's right. I want to be sure that you fill Connally
in on this.
K: I'm
seeing him tomorrow morning.
P: Now,
I have decided that what we will do is to have a meeting. I'm going to call Haldeman,
you don't do anything about it.
K:
Right.
P: But I
have decided to have a meeting to start at
K:
Terrific.
P: I
think we better. I think that Connally should be
there due to the aid/3/ part of it, don't you agree.
/3/ A transcript of a telephone conversation between Kissinger
and Connally on December 5 in which they discussed
cutting off economic assistance to
K:
Absolutely.
P: I
don't want Mitchell there; I don't think it's that sort of a thing. I think
Laird should be there if he is around. If not,-
K:
Packard would be good.
P:
Packard, right, And that's it.
K: And Moorer, I guess Moorer.
P: Yes,
to report on the military situation.
K:
Right.
P: Um-humm.
K: The
same group as which as did the
P: Yeah.
K: Connally to replace Mitchell really.
P: Well,
now, let's ask-maybe we shouldn't have Connally, what
do you think?
K: I
think Connally would be good.
P: Yeah.
Well, I think he would be good for the discussion, yeah, because he will be
tough as hell. Yeah. Because this will be a subject for discussion; I'm not
going to have those cameras for the whole meeting, only for the first 10
minutes.
K: Right.
[Omitted
here is discussion unrelated to
P: Yeah.
Well, now getting back to this thing on
K:
Terrific.
P: No,
no-he said, no give at all on this resolution; we can't do it. And that's that.
He's told Bush to pass the word around that that's the line that we're going
to-and he said we would veto another resolution-another ceasefire alone. I said,
fine; you bet your life we will veto it.
K: Good,
good. I told that to Sisco and Bush this morning and
they must have brought him around. And that WSAG meeting.
P: All
right.
K: Good,
Mr. President.
P: Fine,
bye.
Source: Document 230, volume XI,