Transcript of Telephone
Conversation between Secretary of State Rogers and the President's Assistant
for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)/1/
/1/ Source: Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 397, Telephone
Conversations, Home File, Dec 1971. No classification marking. The conversation
was tape-recorded at Kissinger's residence and subsequently transcribed at the
White House. No time appears on the transcript.
R: Hello.
K: Bill.
R: Yeah, Henry.
K: How are you?
R: Fine, thank you.
K: I wanted to bring you
up-to-date on just one item that happened late yesterday afternoon, and I
called you earlier. We had suggested to the Chinese a while ago that maybe we
should establish direct contact in
R: U-humm.
K: They have now come back and
said they don't want that.
R: U-humm.
K: And that anything can be
done through the Pakistanis or other friends.
R: That's the way George [H.W.
Bush] has been working.
K: Right. It's nothing, I just wanted you to be aware of that.
R: U-humm.
K: Otherwise, I don't have
anything. I called you earlier just to find out how things-
R: Yeah. I think the fighting
is exaggerated in the press. Cause there seems to be a lot less in the-
K: In the West.
R: No, in the press I say
there is-
K: No, no, I think-but you
mean in the West or in the East?
R: Well, both. In other words,
although I am not talking about the movement of forces now but I am talking about casualties and losses and so forth. My
military people say that plane losses, for example, so far we haven't had too
many confirmations. We are inclined to think it is roughly 15 on either side in
that area. The Indians have admitted 11 [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified].
K: Yeah.
R: Well, I'll be in touch with
you in a little while. We're going over the fix now as we see it and then we
will want to talk a little later about the Security Council. I thought it went
very well yesterday.
K: I think actually it's come
out-well, I think the backgrounder played very well.
R: Yeah, it did. You know,
it's just really a question in the long run. We didn't accomplish really what
we wanted to do and that is to convince everybody that we have taken all the
right moves. But we performed the other task the President wanted performed,
that is to condemn
K: No, and I think it lays the
basis for establishing the fact that we have taken the right moves. You know,
you don't expect the New York Times ever to like anything we did.
R: Yeah. Well, I think we have
got a major decision if this thing continues to grow and that is whether we
want to burn our bridges behind us or not with
K: Well, the other question is
what do we gain by tacking towards them now?
R: Well, it isn't really
tacking towards them now. It's just a question of how much do we want to get
involved in the public mind with the war itself and it's something we want to
ask ourselves thoughtfully it seems to me now.
K: Well, no one is against
discussing anything thoughtful.
R: That's all I am saying. In
the long run do we want to go all out and take the exact Chinese position or do
we want to be somewhere in between. At the moment we are somewhere in
between-between the
K: Well, our present position
is to try to be say two-thirds of the way towards
R: Yeah.
K: Which
must have profound consequences in other parts of international areas.
R: I'm not challenging that.
I'm just saying that I think the President should think through very carefully
each step from now on; particularly because it is the kind of thing that if it
continues to grow sort of shadows our position of a more peaceful world and
maybe that's the only course. Maybe there is nothing we can do about it.
K: Well, what do you think we
can do about it?
R: At least we can talk about
it. In other words, I think the President should get involved now. I think we
should have the Security Council discuss it and I think he should-
K: There is no question about
that.
R: Yeah, that's all I'm
saying. It has, as you said, it has profound repercussions and it may blow over
or it may be that-
K: It won't blow over.
R: I don't think so, I never
have thought so. As you know, I-
K: There's no conceivable way
it can blow over.
R: I don't think so. Well,
it's conceivable, it can blow over the way it did the last time although, even
the last time it lasted quite a while.
K: Well, there's no way it can
blow over without
R: No, I don't think so
either.
K: I mean that's going to be
the outcome and the question is in part, what we have here is an
Indian-Soviet-I mean however this issue started and whatever the pros and cons
of the local situation were, it's gone far beyond that.
R: I see. Which is what we
thought all along and I think we have to ask ourselves where we want to be a
year from now, at least at the time of the election and two years from now,
three years from now and whether there is much we can do to affect the course
of events.
K: Yeah, but there are always
two problems, one is do we affect the immediate course of events and secondly,
how do we position ourselves even if we can't affect the course of events.
R: I agree.
K: Because if you say we
affect-that anybody who can create a fait accompli, we then say we can't affect
the course of events and we'll not challenge it.
R: Oh, I don't . . . [you?]
seem to be suggesting, Henry, that I am drawing a conclusion from my questions.
I'm asking the same questions you are asking-
K: No, I think there should be
a National Security-I don't know whether it should be a whole National Security
Council meeting or a meeting of some of the close advisors.
R: Well, I think that maybe
that's better but I think we should and as I say, because I asked the questions
I'm not drawing the conclusions, I'm asking the questions and I think the
President should ask the questions.
K: Absolutely.
R: I think we shouldn't act
just in petulance. Christ, obviously it's annoying and obviously she's been a
bitch.
K: Well, so far he hasn't
acted in petulance.
R: No, no; but I say it's one
of those things where we ought to think about it and talk about it and get the
other fellow's point of view. My own view would be that we ought [to meet]
tomorrow.
K: Yeah, the trouble tomorrow
is that he's got that whole goddamn day scheduled with that television
thing./2/
/2/ The American Broadcasting
Company was scheduled to film "A Day in the Life of the President" on
December 6.
R: Well, I think we ought to
be careful about that. In other words, I think that's one of the reasons I
think we ought to have a meeting. If major war is broken out and he spends the
whole day taping a television show, I'm not sure that's the best posture for
him.
K: No, I think we have to have
a meeting tomorrow.
R: Yeah, I think so. Okay,
Henry, I'll be back in touch.
Source: Document 227, volume XI,