Memorandum
from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to
President Nixon/1/
/1/
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 37,
President's Daily Briefs, Dec 1-Dec 16, 1971. Top Secret;
Sensitive; Codeword. A stamp on the memorandum indicates the President
saw it.
Washington, December 6, 1971.
SUBJECT
Information Items
India-Pakistan
Situation: The Indian forces are continuing their all-out offensive into East Pakistan
and heavier fighting is developing in the West where the Paks
seem to be taking the initiative. In more detail the military situation looks
as follows:
-In East Pakistan
the Indian forces are making gradual progress on several fronts. They are
pressing the outnumbered Pak forces on several strategic fronts and the Indian
gains so far may be laying the basis for more dramatic successes in the near
future. The Indian objective is to force a Pak
surrender in East Pakistan within the next week, if at all possible.
-Ground action on the Indian-West Pakistan front has been increasing, but it is
not yet as widespread as in the East and neither side appears to be making
clear-cut major gains. The Indian strategy is to maintain an essentially
defensive posture in the West until the battle is won in the East, but there
are indications that the Paks may be preparing a
major offensive thrust in Kashmir that would undoubtedly force an Indian counter.
-In the air war, India has apparently achieved complete air superiority in the
East and is using its air force to support the ground offensive. The Indians
continue to bomb and strafe military targets in major cities in both East and West Pakistan.
Fuel storage tanks in the Dacca and Chittagong areas of East
Pakistan and in the West Pakistan
part [port] of Karachi have been especially hard hit.
-The navies of both countries are also active. The Indian Navy is blockading
ports in both East and West
Pakistan and claim to have sunk
two Pak destroyers and to have shelled the port of
Karachi. India's aircraft carrier is operating against East Pakistan.
The numerical superiority of India's fleet should give it a decided advantage in any future
naval combat.
On the
political front, Mrs. Gandhi has announced India's long-anticipated recognition of Bangla
Desh as an independent nation. Even though the
significance of this move has been lessened by the hostilities, the Paks responded by breaking diplomatic relations with India. The Swiss will look after Pakistan's interests in New Delhi.
Last
night's Security Council meeting on the Indo-Pak crisis underlined both the
isolation of the Soviet/Indian position and the determination of the USSR to prevent any resolution not to its liking. The Soviet
draft resolution (calling for an East
Pakistan political settlement
which would "inevitably result in a cessation of hostilities" and for
Pakistan to cease acts of violence in East Pakistan
which "led to the deterioration of the situation") was defeated; 2 in
favor (USSR and Poland), 1 against (China) and 12 abstaining (including the U.S.). Another resolution co-sponsored by eight non-permanent
members (calling for a cease-fire, withdrawal, efforts to bring about conditions
necessary for the return of refugees) lost to a Soviet veto; 11 in favor
(including the U.S.), 2 against (USSR, Poland) and 2 abstaining (UK, France),
just as the U.S. draft had yesterday. The Pak representative had found this
resolution acceptable. The Chinese resolution (condemning Indian aggression)
was not put to a vote but the Chinese continued to sharply attack India. Sino-Soviet name-calling continued throughout the debate.
Most
speakers deplored the inability of the Council to act, with the British and the
French lamenting the Council's proceeding to vote on resolutions which would
fail. Following the vote the Italian representative tabled a resolution limited
to a call for an immediate cease-fire as a first step. However, he was stopped from
pressing the resolution to a vote by a movement to adjourn until this afternoon
supported by the USSR, U.S., UK and France which was accepted by the Council. There were suggestions
during the corridor consultations that the issue be
taken to the General Assembly if the Council proved unable to act. The more
likely immediate pressure, however, will operate in the direction of the
Italian proposal for a simple cease-fire resolution.
[Omitted
here are summary reports on foreign policy issues unrelated to South Asia.]
Source: Document 232, volume XI, South
Asia crisis 1971, Department of State.