Message from
the
/1/ Source:
National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 497,
President's Trip Files, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin
and Kissinger, Vol. 2. No classification marking. A handwritten note on the
message indicates it was handed to Kissinger by Soviet Chargé Vorontsov at
1. The
Soviet leaders, already for a prolonged time and not once, have drawn the
attention of the President to a dangerous situation developing in the Hindostan peninsula as a result of the actions of the
Pakistani government against the population of
Although the
American side did not object in principle to the approach above, we, it must be
said frankly, did not receive the impression that the United States acted
actively enough and precisely in the same direction that we were acting, i.e.
towards removing the main source of tension in relations between Pakistan and
India.
2. In the
situation that has now developed-and now it has flared up into the armed
conflict between Pakistan and India-the Soviet Union, as was stated in the TASS
statement published December 5, comes out for the speediest ending of the
bloodshed and for a political settlement in East Pakistan on the basis of
respect for the lawful rights and interests of its people.
In
accordance with the above the Soviet representative in the Security Council has
been instructed to seek such a solution that would closely combine two
questions: a proposal for an immediate cease-fire between
In view of
all the circumstances which led to the present conflict, to demand a cease-fire
without demanding, as an organic connection with that question, that the people
of East Pakistan in the name of its elected representatives be given an
opportunity to decide its destiny for themselves,-would be both unrealistic and
unjust with respect to that people, and would not eliminate the causes which
led to the conflict.
3. As for
your remarks, Mr. Kissinger, regarding a possible sharply negative impact that
the events in the Hindostan could have on
Soviet-American relations, this kind of approach is completely without
motivation and, in our view, is at variance with the approach to the
Soviet-American relations which has been expressed not once to us by the
President himself.
Differences
in the appraisal of specific events in the world as well as in the views between
us regarding ways of settling corresponding questions may arise, and there is
nothing unnatural in that. However, if in such cases, instead of business-like
search for realistic solutions, to start talking about a "critical stage" or
"watershed" in Soviet-American relations, it would hardly help finding such
solutions, and would make it still harder to envisage that it will facilitate
improvement of Soviet-American relations and their stability./2/
/2/
Kissinger called President Nixon shortly after the Soviet message was received
and reported that the Soviet leadership had "twitched a little bit."
He said the Soviet message proposed a Security Council resolution which called
for a cease-fire and a cessation of hostilities, but made no provision for the
withdrawal of troops. Kissinger viewed the references in the message to
Source: Document 241, volume XI,