December
7, 1971
Memorandum for Mr. Henry A. Kissinger The White
House
From: Theodore Eliot Jr
Subject: Jordanian F-104's for Pakistan
At the WASAG meeting on the morning of December 6,
the question was raised as to the legal and policy problems involved in responding
to a Jordanian request for a USG consent to transfer F-104's to Pakistan.
Since the United States provided the F-104's now in
Jordanian possession, USG consent would be necessary for their transfer to any
third country, including Pakistan. Under the present U.S. policy of suspending all
arms transfers to Pakistan, the USG could not consent
to such a transfer. Section 9 of Public Law 91-672 (January 12, 1971), amending
the Foreign Military Sales Act, provides:
"In considering a request for approval of any
transfer of a defense article to another country under section 505 (a) (1) and
(a) (4) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and section 3 (a)(2) of the
Foreign Military Sales Act, the President shall not give his consent to the
transfer unless the United States itself would transfer the defense article
under consideration to that country."
The United States has, since the 1965
Indian-Pakistani hostilities, refused to supply or to license the export of
lethal end items for Pakistan. The only exception to this
policy since 1965 is the so-called one-time exception which was announced in
October 1970. Under this one-time exception, the United States offered to supply 300 armored
personnel carriers and approximately 20 aircraft. The aircraft offered were
F-104's but, after the Pakistanis expressed a preference for F-Ss, the United States indicated a willingness to
supply F-5's under the one-time exception. The United States offer of aircraft was never
formally accepted by the Pakistani Government, but a contract for armored
personnel carriers was signed in January 1971. Following the outbreak of
fighting in East Pakistan in late March 1971, the USG announced, among other
things, that it would hold in abeyance any further action on the one-time
exception. This policy was formally confirmed in a public statement of policy
issued on July 1, 1971.
Conclusion:
In view of the foregoing, the President could not
give his consent to the transfer of Jordanian F-104's to Pakistan unless he
were also willing to establish, as a matter of policy, the USG's willingness to
supply the F-104's directly. Such a policy decision would be consistent with
the October 1970 one-time exception, but would conflict sharply with our
general policy since 1965 against supply of lethal end items and, specifically,
with the July 1, 1971 announcement that action on the one-time exception would
be held in abeyance. It would also conflict with the prohibition on military
assistance and sales to Pakistan, in the pending aid legislation,
which has been approved by both Houses.
Furthermore, the transfer of these aircraft to Pakistan would create a serious
deficit in Jordan's fighter inventory. Our
consent could lead to a Jordanian expectation that the USG would replace these
aircraft. At present there is no suitable aircraft available. Even if there
were, to replace them through MAP would, in view of the present shortage of
funds, require postponing the supply of APC's, tanks, and engineering
equipment which the Jordanian army badly needs.
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur
Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 419 - 420