Letter from
Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon/1/
/1/
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 497,
President's Trip Files, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin
and Kissinger, Vol. 2. The source text is an unofficial translation, apparently
done in the Soviet Embassy or the Foreign Ministry. A handwritten notation on
the letter indicates it was handed to Kissinger by Soviet Minister Vorontsov on December 9 at
Dear Mr.
President:
We have
already conveyed to you certain reflections regarding the developments in the Hindostan peninsula that we had in connection with your
preliminary considerations transmitted through Mr. Kissinger./2/ Now your
letter/3/ has been received, and I would like to set forth to you, in an urgent
manner as required by the acuteness of the question, our considerations in
greater detail.
/2/
See Document 231.
/3/
Document 236.
I would
like to note, first of all, that we are also profoundly concerned about the
situation in the Hindostan peninsula, the more so
that the dangerous events are taking place in immediate proximity to the
borders of the
The events
that had led to the armed conflict between
Concerned
about the dangerous development of events in the
And that
essence is that as a result of the reprisal by the Pakistani authorities
against those political forces in East Pakistan which were given full
confidence by the people in the December 1970 elections and as a result of
cruel repressions against the broad masses of the East Pakistani population,
India was flooded with a stream of refugees unprecedented in history-some 10
million people. This influx of many millions of those ill fated and deprived is
a misfortune not only for themselves but also for
But it was
clear all along that it would be impossible to get the refugees back to their
native hearths without a political settlement in East Pakistan itself through
negotiations between the Pakistani Government and the East Pakistani leaders
who were elected by the people, and elected at that by universal vote which the
Pakistani authorities themselves termed as completely free. That is why we
advised President Yahya Khan to speedily take that
path. We figured that the
Our
approach in this matter has not been and is not one-sided. We persistently
expressed to both
Unfortunately,
President Yahya Khan and his Government did not take
our advice. We are still puzzled as to the reason why the Pakistani leadership
did not want to follow the way of political settlement-the way of negotiations.
But the fact remains that they preferred to conduct the affairs in such a way
as to make the guns speak and blood shed. Nobody can tell how many people have
already perished-and still many more may die.
I shall
not, however, go into this side of the matter. I would like to draw your
attention to another thing, We are far from making the
conclusion that everything is now lost and nothing can be done. Such a
conclusion could only be dictated by lack of confidence in the power of reason
and in the possibilities for action, which remain in the present situation as
well.
The
You refer
to your understanding that in times of international crises neither we nor you
should seek unilateral advantages. I agree with this. But I would go beyond
that and would say that it is important not only to formulate this realistic
principle but also, on its basis, to act for the purpose of overcoming the
crisis. In general I believe that a favorable element, from the viewpoint of
prospects in the struggle for ending the conflict, is that there is no confrontation
here of our two powers. And this being the case, we have all the more ground
for parallel actions.
The thing
to do now is to stop the war already underway. This requires a cease-fire. But
the question arises-what is the best way to achieve it? It seems to us that,
proceeding from the situation which developed from the very start,
effective can be such a cease-fire which would be connected with a simultaneous
decision for a political settlement, based on the recognition of the will of
the East Pakistani population. Otherwise it is impossible to ensure the respect
for the lawful rights and interests of the people of
You already
know about this proposal of ours, i.e. to solve together and simultaneously
both questions-of cease-fire and of immediate resumption of negotiations
between the Government of Pakistan and the East Pakistani leaders concerning a
political settlement in
/4/
Kissinger briefed Nixon on Brezhnev's letter less than 2 hours after he
received it: "They're proposing a cease-fire and a political negotiation
between
That is
why I would like to pose a question to you: is the above mentioned basis for the
restoration of peace and ensuring the political settlement acceptable to the
The crust
[sic] of the whole matter, as we are convinced, is the question of how to exert
due influence upon President Yahya Khan and his
Government. We continue to do that. But here, it seems, you have more
possibilities.
The events
in the Hindostan peninsula constitute a major
question. It is necessary to do everything in order to bring about a turn
towards peace there, and our two powers can in many respects contribute to
that. Particularly needed for this purpose is a calm and balanced approach
which would take into account both the specifics of the current moment and the
general prospects of world development.
My
colleagues and I will be waiting for your earliest possible reaction to the
considerations above.
Sincerely,
L. Brezhnev
Source: Document 253, volume XI,