The Secretary of State
Washington

S/S 19493

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUB : Turkish Tanks for Pakistan December 18, 1969

I have reviewed the Turkey-Pakistan tank transaction on the basis of word from Ankara that Turkey would be willing to go ahead if' we approved a request for the sale.

As you will recall, this transaction originated with a personal commitment from former President Johnson to former President Ayub in December 1967 under which President Johnson undertook to help obtain tanks for Pakistan via a third country. As the proposal now stands, we would approve the sale by Turkey to Pakistan of 100 M-47 tanks and would provide Turkey with an equal number of renovated M-48 tanks at a cost to the United States of $3.7 million.

This arrangement could be approved under our present arms policy. It could also be interpreted as a political gesture to President Yahya and as a follow-up to your visit to Pakistan. If we disapproved the sale, Pakistan might consider that we had reneged on a commitment of the previous Administration and had not taken advantage of an opportunity to assist Pakistan in buying from non-Communist sources.

Despite these considerations, I recommend that we not proceed with the tank transaction because:

1 . We would get relatively little out of the transaction in Pakistan compared with the disproportionate damage to our relations with India - which are relatively more important.

2. India would regard the tank transaction as a significant step by this Administration in favor of Pakistan. In the current charged political atmosphere in India, this might generate pressures on the Indian Government to revive the Hanoi recognition question.

3. The tank transaction would stimulate criticism on the Hill, especially on the Senate side. Aside from Congressional opposition on political-military grounds, we would also be criticized for our active efforts "to make the deal work,"

including our willingness to facilitate the sale by underwriting - for $3.7 million the additional cost for the more modern M-48 tanks which we would supply Turkey.

4. The Pakistan Ambassador in Amman confirmed to us this month that Pakistan is planning to send an anti-aircraft battalion of 600 men to Jordan equipped with 40 mm. guns. (We have decided not to intervene with the Pakistanis because King Hussain would strongly resent our action since we have been unable to meet his anti-aircraft requirements and he presumably is accepting Pakistani guns in preference to Soviet offers). Although the Pakistani 40 mm. guns are not United States supplied and will be used for defensive purposes, there is likely to be sharp criticism in the Congress and the press when the public learns that Pakistan has introduced the first non-Arab military forces into Jordan. This criticism will be intensified if the United States about the same time announces it is approving the sale of United States-controlled Turkish tanks to Pakistan.

5. Finally, two aspects of our relationship with Pakistan have changed since this

transaction was initially discussed two years ago:

- At that time, we still had intelligence facilities in Pakistan but subsequently Pakistan terminated the agreement for those facilities.

- Pakistan later arranged with the USSR to obtain two hundred Soviet tanks, which reportedly will be delivered by the end of 1970.

Because of the foregoing factors I suggest that the tank question be considered in the context of our overall review of South Asia military supply policy which is scheduled for NSC discussion within the next week or two.

William P. Rogers

Source: The American Papers- Secret and Confidential India.Pakistan.Bangladesh Documents 1965-1973, The University Press Limited, p.324-325