Department of State

 

Washington, D.C. 20520

 

SECRET

 

 

 

TO               :   The Acting Secretary

THROUGH  :   S/S

FROM          :   NEA- Joseph J. Sisco

SUBJECT     :   DEPARTMENT POSITION ON THE PAPER REASSESSING US POLICY FOR PAKISTAN

                        ACTION MEMORANDUM

 

 

There is attached a draft paper (Tab A) which you may wish to table as the Department's position at the Senior Review Group Meeting. It recommends that we support the second broad policy strategy set out on page 24 of the attached Policy Reassessment Paper (Tab B). It also recommends that we support the implementation of the specific policy decisions set out in the Second Option on pages 29-31.

 

We believe that the second policy strategy and the decisions flowing from it are the most effective way of meeting our interests in South Asia as a whole and in Pakistan in particular. I believe the first option, which attempts to minimize our disassociation from the Yahya regime and suggests virtually full continuation of our military and economic programs, is unrealistic, both in terms of Congressional criticism of those policies, the distaste widely felt by the U.S. public for the actions of the Yahya government in East Pakistan, and the conditions on the ground which make it extremely unlikely that we would in fact be able to go ahead with our policies without changing the basically sound criteria for our assistance on which we have insisted in the past.

 

Similarly while the third option would accord with the strongly held sentiments of our Consul General in Dacca and Ambassador Keating in New Delhi, it does not take into account the limitations on our leverage with the Pakistanis, the prospect that the conflict may be a prolonged one, and the need to maintain a relationship with Pakistan over the longer term.

 

I therefore believe you should endorse the second strategy which uses our leverage selectively to move President Yahya towards an early restoration of peaceful conditions and political negotiations, stresses the humanitarian aspects of our activities which will be of long-term importance in our relations with the Bengalis and insists clearly on the scrupulous adherence of the Pakistani Government to the development criteria which are vital to our ongoing programs. On the sensitive military supply issue, in view of the sharp Congressional reaction, I believe we have no alternative to keeping in abeyance the delivery of lethal equipment, particularly those items which have been used against the Bengali separatists.

 

Recommendation

That you approve the attached paper as a statement of Department Policy towards Pakistan.

 

                                                                               Clearance:

Attachments:                                                                    NEA - Mr. Van Hollen

Tab A - State Department Position Paper.                       NEA/INC: ACEQuainton: nm

Tab B - Policy Options Paper.                                         4/15/71, x21289

 

 

 

 

DRAFT

Pakistan American Relations-A Reassessment

 

It is the view of the Department of State that the paper reassessing our relations with Pakistan adequately considers the issues facing the United States Government at this time. Its general strategies and specific policy options set out the major decisions which we now have before us.

 

The paper sets out the objectives for the US Government in terms of our national interests as follows:  .

·            To prevent an escalation of the crisis;

•      To create conditions which would reduce political instability and permit economic development to proceed.

•      To preserve a relationship with both West and East Pakistan in circumstances either of a united or divided Pakistan.

•      To prevent any major external power from achieving decisive advantage in South Asia as a result of the crisis.

 

In terms of these objectives and our national interests broadly defined in the paper, the Department of State believes that we should adopt Policy Strategy II -  selective5elective use of US influence and should implement the strategy following the decisions set forth on pages 29-31 of the paper. Specifically the United States Government should:

 

(1) Write to Yahya emphasizing our interest in humanitarian relief efforts, our desire to resume development activities when our established development criteria make this possible, express our hope for renewed political accommodation and inform him of the growing Congressional concern about the use of US-supplied arms.

 

(2) Reiterate public statements including the one of April 7 which indicate our hope for a restoration of peace and a political dialogue, possibly adding public expressions of concern over the use of US arms.

 

(3) Limit our dealings with Bengali separatists to very_. informal contacts at this point.

 

(4) Keep in abeyance the implementation of the 1970 one-time exception and shipments of ammunition and spare parts for equipment which we know has been used or might be used in East Pakistan. If the conditions return to normal or a political dialogue is resumed, permit the sale of non-lethal equipment and consider proceeding with the negotiation of the agreement for maritime patrol aircraft under the one-time exception keeping other arms decisions under continuing review.

 

(5) Sign the deferred PL-480 cyclone relief agreement and inform the GOP we will ship the grain authorized under earlier agreements as soon as there is evidence that the food can be unloaded and distributed in East Pakistan.

 

(6) Postpone discussion on new and ongoing aid comitments until a consortium meeting has

been held to review the prospect for development activity in Pakistan.

 

(7) Continue to encourage the GOP to accept international relief assistance in which we

would participate.

 

(8) Indicate our willingness to join with other consortium donors in a limited debt exercise.

 

 

NEA/INC: ACEQuainton: nm