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ওসমানী ১৯৭১
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যে Ops Plan
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Ops Plan
INTRODUCTION
1. The
liberation war has gone on for last six months. It is time to assess the
progress in the field, isolate and analyse failings and problems, if any, and
work out plans to speed up progress of the war to achieve our goal of complete
independence of
2. During the
last six months progress in the field has varied widely and gone through phases
of ups and downs. However, it can be broadly said that though we have inflicted
a degree of damage on the enemy, it is far short of what we should have
achieved. In fact, from the study of the sitreps a positive decline in our war
effort and success becomes evidently clear.
3. Our effort
in the field, for the purpose of analytical study can be broken up as follows:
a. Raising of Bde and its ops - We have raised a bde
with threes E
Bengal Bns, These Bns, however, had only 50 or less of the original troops.
Therefore, short.. fall had to be made up by milking troops such as EPR, Mujahids
and Ansars from Sectors. This did not provide the standard of troops we
required for regular bns. The bde started its training in the month of July and
has been under training for 3 months. With this short training and shortage of
offrs the ops efficiency of the bde can not assessed as very high. In any case,
without armour, it is incapable of launching major offensive and therefore, the
thought of liberating a lodgement area and to hold it, is not practicable. For
all this period the bde has not been effectively utilised and cannot be utilised
effectively in near future for the role it has been raised,
b. Sector Troops
During early stage of the liberation war, the sector
troops were operating reasonably well. However, with the milking of best.
troops from the sectors for bde, the effectiveness of the sector troops
decreased significantly. Some of the EPR, Mujahids and Ansars who were left
behind are old and have lost their usefulness as ops troops. In fact a number
of them while going inside for ops have been indulging in loot, rape etc. Their
ops, therefore, has been counter productive and has turned a large section of
people, particularly in the border region where they have been operating,
against us. The state of discipline of the sector troops is also very poor and
is not conducive to the successful launching of ops. At best they can be
utilised in defensive role provided they are not subjected to heavy enemy
offensive.
Guerilla Ops
The guerillas have been trained since the month of May,
initially at the rate of 5 thousands per month. The figure is now 20 thousand
per month. Till to date approximately 13 thousand guerillas have been inducted
inside. However, the result expected out of them has not been realised. In fact
their performance has been disappointing. Some of the guerillas are indulging
in loot and other anti-social activities, some are sitting idle, some are
carrying out very insignificant ops like cutting telephone lines and only 15 to
20 per cent guerillas are carrying out proper operation. Even the effectiveness
of these guerillas is negligible because of lack of co-ordinated ops.
Org and leadership: Another factor which has
contributed towards the poor performance of the guerillas is that the
recruitment of guerillas has not been carried out properly and therefore right
materials have not selected and trained.
The selection of guerillas has been indifferent. As
a result there are large number of people, who have joined only to have means
of livelihood, or to get arms for anti-social activities or for self
protection.
4. The
over all Result Achieved
From the
above it can be seen the total force available at our disposal have not been
operating effectively. Absence of an overall planning and realistic allocation
of priorities are some of pain factors responsible for the above. The complete
absence of contact between the forces HQ and the forces in the field is another
factor which is in no less measure responsible for the above. At the present we
are hardly killing any Pakistani troops and maximum efforts have been diverted
in killing Rajakars or other civilians - our own people. To set an example it
can be mentioned that in
5. Allocation
of Priorities
In this war we have faced with an enemy
who is very well trained, well equipped and resourceful. We will need a force
of 15 Divisions of troops to be able to defeat the enemy in a conventional war.
This is impracticable and needs no further consideration Therefore, we have to
base our war strategy primarily on the unconventional war. It is therefore,
essential that the guerilla ops is accorded the highest priority. Normally the
guerilla op starts with the nucleus of a handful of hard core dedicated men and
the leadership automatically evolves over a period of tine. We have to wage
this war to a successful conclusion within e small time frame for obvious
reason. In our case therefore, we have to induct guerillas and the leadership.
Considering the limited time
available at our disposal, we will be able to achieve this by inducting our
regular forces into Coy/ Pl groups alongwith their commanders inside
6. Recruitment
One of
the pre-requisites or success of guerilla ops is that the right material is
trained and inducted. Only the most dedicated and motivated youths can provide
this. It will. therefore, entail certain changes in our recruitment system. It
has been experienced in the past that to recruit such large number of youths,
employment of professionals are essential. It is not possible for our political
leaders such as MNA/MPA to devote whole time for recruitment only. Therefore it
is necessary that enthusiastic and energatic people are employed to carry out
the recruitment properly and selectively.
7. Leadership
Inspite of induction of bns inside we
will still be short of leaders of guerillas at various levels. We are expecting
to receive approximately 60 offrs in the 1st week of Oct 71. These offrs should
be initially posted to the sectors for gaining experience. After 2 to 3 weeks
of ops in the sectors, most of these offrs should be inducted inside to provide
leadership. In addition, volunteer and enthusiastic MNAs/MPAs and political
workers should be trained in guerilla warfare and inducted inside as guerilla
leaders.
7. Sector ops
While the guerilla will operate inside we
must keep the border alive with ops so that the enemy is unable to pull out
troops from the border for re-inforcement inside against our guerilla ops.
Sector ops will ensure, besides causing damage and harassment to enemy, tieing
up of number of troops along the border. Because of the delay in launching of
guerillas, we have a large number of guerillas still waiting to be launched. At
any one time, we will have 15 thousand to 20 thousand guerillas awaiting on the
border.
If these guerillas are used effectively as sector
troops, the number of ops carried out would be large enough to inflict the
desired rate of hasrrassment and attrition on the enemy and will tie down a
large number of en troops alongwith the border and in fact
drawing more, from inside, as the war progressess.
8. Brigades
As the utility of Bde and Bns are very
limited at present, these regular troops should go in Coy/P1 group to form the
nucleus of guerilla ops. These regular units, must be connected with wrls
communication so that they can be regrouped in the shortest possible time. The
wrls communication will also ensure proper coord of guerilla activities.
9. Overall Plan
Overall plan should be to base our war
strategy primarily on guerilla ops. Nucleus and leadership of guerilla ops
should be provided by regular bns in Coy/Pl groups inducting inside. They will
also direct and co-ordinate activities of the guerillas. Remaining gap in the
leadership should be filled in by inducting the newly trained offrs and by
trained MNAs/MPAs/Political workers. While the guerillas will tie down, large
number of forces inside, the sector ops must be on full swing to ensure tieing
of a large number of enemy forces on the border. This will ensure wide disposal
of enemy in smalller strength thus offering small and weak targets to us. The
regular forces operating inside as guerillla should have wrls communication so
that they are capable of concentrating large forces for ops inside and also to
be able to be regroup themselves into Bn or Bde for launching regular ops. In
order to get the best material for successful ops inside, recruitment must be
carried out in close coord with the Youth Camp org and through professionals
whole time employed for this purpose. We are short of certain basic as well as
sophisticated wpns. With some sophisticated wpns the guerilla activities can be
subtaintially stepped up. The fund raised by Bangladesh nationals abroad,
should be immediately utilised to procure basic as well as sophisticated wpns
at the earliest.
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